

Takeharu SOGO

Professeur associé

Académie : Globalisation

Centre de recherche : Finance & Accounting Insights on Risk and Regulation

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Intérêts de recherche

Auction Theory, Information Economics, Mergers and Acquisitions

Formation

2015 Ph.D.in Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Etats-Unis d'Amérique

2005 Master in MA in Economics, Kyoto University, Japon

Expérience Professionnelle

Positions académiques principales

Depuis 2019 Associate Professor, SKEMA Business School, France

2017 - 2019 Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, Japon

2014 - 2017 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Global Business, Osaka International University, Japon

Autres affiliations académiques

2022 Visiting Scholar, Waseda University, Japon

Publications

Articles académiques revus

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2020). Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 188, pp. 105041.

SOGO, T. (2019). Competition among Procrastinators. *Theory and Decision*, 86, pp. 325-337.

SOGO, T. (2017). Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 55, pp. 166-181.

HSU, C.L., MATTA, R., POPOV, S.V. et SOGO, T. (2017). Optimal Product Placement. *Review of Industrial Organization*, 51(1), pp. 127-145.

SOGO, T., BERNHARDT, D. et LIU, T. (2016). Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid Auctions. *American Economic Review*, 106(11), pp. 3577-3589.

Documents de recherche

SOGO, T., MORITA, K. et MURAMOTO, A. (2024). *Optimal Contracts Under Interpersonal Projection*. SSRN.

SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2022). *Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders*. 4207422, SSRN Electronic Journal.

HAYASHIDA, O., MORITA, K. et SOGO, T. (2022). *Transparency and Innovation in Organizations*. 4053625, SSRN Electronic Journal.

SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2022). *Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders*. SSRN.

Présentations dans des conférences

SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2023). *Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders*. Dans: The European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). Rome.

SOGO, T., MORITA, K. et MURAMOTO, A. (2023). *Optimal Contracts Under Interpersonal Projection*. Dans: The 29th Decentralization Conference. Osaka.

CONG, P., MURAMOTO, A. et SOGO, T. (2023). *Changing Tastes, Projection Bias, and Consumer Search*. Dans: The 29th Decentralization Conference. Osaka.

SOGO, T., HAYASHIDA, O. et MORITA, K. (2022). *Transparency and Innovation in Organizations*. Dans: EEA-ESEM 2022. Milan.

MURAMOTO, A. et SOGO, T. (2022). *Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders*. Dans: EEA-ESEM 2022. Milan.

MURAMOTO, A. et SOGO, T. (2022). *Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders*. Dans: EARIE 2022. Vienna.

HAYASHIDA, O., MORITA, K. et SOGO, T. (2019). *Feedback and Development in Tournaments*. Dans: International Meeting on Game Theory. St Petersburg.

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2018). *Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs*. Dans: APIOC (Asia-Pacific Industrial Organisation Conference). Melbourne.

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2018). *Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs*. Dans: Jornadas de Economia Industrial (JEI). Barcelona.

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2018). *Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs*. Dans: EARIE (Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics). Athens.

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2018). *Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs*. Dans: Econometric Society Australasia Meeting (ESAM). Auckland.

BERNHARDT, D., LIU, T. et SOGO, T. (2018). *Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs*. Dans: Economic Theory Conference. Beijing.

SOGO, T. (2017). *Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment*. Dans: APIOC (Asia-Pacific Industrial Organisation Conference). Auckland.

SOGO, T. et KAWAI, K. (2017). *Planned Opacity in Securitization*. Dans: Financial Market Liquidity Conference. Budapest.

SOGO, T. et KAWAI, K. (2017). *Planned Opacity in Securitization*. Dans: EARIE (Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics). Maastricht.

SOGO, T. et KAWAI, K. (2017). *Planned Opacity in Securitization*. Dans: International Society of Dynamic Games Workshop. Warsaw.

SOGO, T. (2016). *Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment*. Dans: World Congress of the Game Theory Society. Maastricht.

SOGO, T. et KAWAI, K. (2016). *Planned Opacity in Securitization*. Dans: Finance and Economics Conference. Frankfurt.

SOGO, T., BERNHARDT, D. et LIU, T. (2016). *Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid Auctions*. Dans: The Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting. Nagoya.

SOGO, T. (2015). *Competition among Procrastinators*. Dans: Association of Behavioral Economics and Finance Annual Meeting. Osaka.

Présentations dans des séminaires de recherche

- SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2024). Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders. Dans: Musashi University. Tokyo.
- SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2023). Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders. Dans: Nagoya University.
- SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2023). Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders. Dans: Kyoto University. Kyoto.
- SOGO, T. et MURAMOTO, A. (2022). Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders. Dans: Microtheory Seminar, University of Glasgow. Glasgow.
- SOGO, T. (2022). Transparency and Innovation in Organizations. Dans: Microeconomics Workshop, Keio University. Tokyo.
- SOGO, T. (2022). Transparency and Innovation in Organizations. Dans: Industry and Labor Economics Workshop, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Tokyo.
- SOGO, T. (2021). Transparency and Innovation in Organizations. Dans: Microeconomics and Game Theory, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University. Kyoto.

Presse et réseaux sociaux

- SOGO, T. (2021). What is the most profitable way to sell? Evidences from research. SKEMA ThinkForward.

Autres activités de recherche

Organisation d'une conférence ou d'un séminaire

- 2019 Decentralization Conference in Japan

Supervision de thèses / HDR

- G. SURESH, Indian Institute of Technology Tirupati, Doctorat, Rapporteur